CV & Research

[6] "The Political Economy of Populism Regime Length" (2025). 

with Nicolás Cachanosky and Tomás Faintich

Constitutional Political Economy (forthcoming)

Left-leaning populist regimes in 21st-century Latin America have become notoriously long, including some that maintained their power by repealing term limits. Along with changes in external factors, we argue that repealing term limits allowed populist leaders to develop longer time horizons and behave more like stationary than roving bandits. We show that, relative to those constrained by time limits, unconstrained populist leaders mitigate the economic effects of the populist cycle of boom, stagnation, and bust. Populists constrained by term limits act like roving bandits, engaging in more extractive rent-seeking that leads to more significant economic fluctuations.

[5]      "The Institutional Impact of Left-Leaning Populism in Latin America" (2025). 

with Nicolás Cachanosky, Alex Padilla, and Karla Hernández.

European Journal of Political Economy, 86: 102629

We study the institutional impact 21st-century left-leaning populist regimes have in Latin America. Looking at the iconic left-leaning populist regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and  Venezuela, we find that these types of populist regimes impose a significant deterioration on the liberal-democracy institutional quality of their countries. The institutional cost is both significant and long-lasting, and our synthetic counterfactual suggests that liberal democratic institutions would have improved if not for these populist regimes.

[4]   "Gender and corruption in firms: The importance of regional context" (2024). 

with Jamie Bologna Pavlik

The Review of Development Economics (forthcoming)

The idea that there are gendered differences in corruption in the political arena is common. Two explanations for these differences include risk aversion and network effects. However, business leaders include a self-selected group of individuals who are comparatively risk-tolerant and well-connected. Using firm-level data for 144 countries from 2006 to 2019, we test whether female-run businesses engage in corruption differently than men. In the aggregate, we find a potentially puzzling result: female-managed firms are engaged in less corruption and report it being less of an obstacle compared to their male counterparts; female-owned firms are just the opposite. Once we disaggregate the data into region-specific estimates, a clearer pattern emerges. Corruption is more harmful for female-run firms in the areas of the world that have more gender inequality overall.

[3]    "Female Ownership of Firms and Regulation Experience" (2024). 

with Jamie Bologna Pavlik

The Journal of Development Studies, 60(9): 1412-1434. 

Using firm-level data and two alternative matching methods, our results suggest that firms with at least one female owner report that senior management spends a larger percentage of their time dealing with regulations. We also find that construction permits take approximately 4–7 days longer to obtain for these same firms. Lastly, we find that female-owned firms perceive labor regulations to be a larger obstacle to business operations. In all cases, these effects tend to be largest in countries with the most disparity in de jure rules.

[2] "Economics Against Tyranny: A Reassesment of the Liberal Order of Mises and Hayek" (2019). 

MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law, and Economics 7(2): 1-11

• • 2nd Prize, Article Competition in Honour of Gabriel Oliva, VI Conferência de Escola Austríaca, Instituto Mises Brasil.

[1] "Competição e Monopólio: o Mainstream e a Escola Austríaca" (2016)

MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law, and Economics 4(2): 377-390