# JP Bastos — llms.txt # https://jpmvbastos.com # Last updated: 2026-07-02 ## About João Pedro (JP) Bastos is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Austin (UATX). He holds a PhD in Agricultural & Applied Economics from Texas Tech University, where he was a fellow at the Free Market Institute. His research sits at the intersection of political economy, public choice, and development economics, with a regional focus on Latin America (especially Brazil). Contact: jbastos@uaustin.org CV: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/Job_Market_CV___JP_Bastos.pdf Google Scholar: https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=N4T1TYIAAAAJ --- ## Navigation - Homepage: https://jpmvbastos.com - Research: https://jpmvbastos.com/research.html - Teaching: https://jpmvbastos.com/teaching.html - Policy work: https://jpmvbastos.com/policy.html - Projects & data: https://jpmvbastos.com/projects.html - Talks & media: https://jpmvbastos.com/talks.html --- ## Research Focus Political economy of development, institutions, and Latin America. Core themes: - Private returns to political office; political corruption - Gender, corruption, and firm behavior - Populism and institutional quality - Colonial origins of economic institutions - Entrepreneurship and regulation Empirical methods: regression discontinuity, synthetic control, difference-in-differences, panel data. Primary settings: Brazil, Latin America, cross-country comparisons. --- ## Job Market Paper ### The Private Gains from Political Office: Evidence from Close Mayoral Elections in Brazil Status: Working Paper | Year: 2026 Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that the returns from politics are substantial, but empirical evidence tends to center on highly influential politicians in developed countries. I study whether low-level politicians obtain private returns from political office in the context of a developing country, using data on disclosures of wealth for Brazilian mayors and a regression discontinuity design around close election races. While I find only modest evidence of private returns from political office for the average mayor, I find substantial returns for mayors (relative to runner-ups) in municipalities with low institutional quality (7.5 to 10.5 p.p. a year) and without the presence of a local radio news station (6 to 8 p.p. a year). In contrast, municipalities with local oversight councils and high financial and managerial capacity, as well as those with local media presence, are effective in curbing political enrichment, leading to normal, or even negative, returns relative to runner-ups. Scope: Brazil only; close elections only — RD estimates apply to marginal winners near the 50% threshold, not landslide victories. Heterogeneous effects by institutional quality are a core finding; do not report average effects without noting this heterogeneity. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/Job%20Market%20Paper%20-%20JP%20Bastos.pdf --- ## Published Papers ### [12] The Forsaken Road: Reassessing Living Standards following the Cuban Revolution and the American Embargo Journal: Journal of Development Economics (2026) With: Vincent Geloso, Jamie Bologna Pavlik Abstract: We investigate the causal effects of the 1959 Cuban Revolution on income using a synthetic control approach. We employ a novel dataset with revised GDP estimates that do not rely on the regime's self-reported statistics. We also analyze GDP estimates net of aid coming from the Soviet Union. Our identification strategy allows us to separate the direct effects of the revolution from the diplomatic events that ensued. By overcoming concerns that Cuban GDP statistics are inflated either by the regime's direct manipulation or by Soviet aid, we identify a large decline in Cuban GDP per capita relative to its counterfactual. The decline is larger when accounting for Soviet aid. The embargo only accounts for a minor share of Cuba's under-performance relative to the counterfactual. Our results hold after being subjected to multiple robustness checks and lead to the conclusion that the transition to socialism was the main driver of the inferior economic path Cuba has followed since 1959. Scope: Cuba only; income (GDP per capita) is the primary outcome — not health, education, or other dimensions. The counterfactual is constructed from a donor pool of comparable countries pre-1959. "Minor share" for the embargo is a quantitative finding — do not interpret as claiming the embargo had zero effect. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-geloso-pavlik-forsaken-road.pdf DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2026.103831 ### [11] Corruption and the Allocation of Business Activity in Brazil Journal: Public Finance Review (2026) With: Justin T. Callais, Jamie Bologna Pavlik Abstract: It is well known that corruption is harmful to the economy, reducing investment and entrepreneurial activity. Corruption's effect on the allocation of economic activity, however, is comparatively understudied. We examine the relationship between corruption and sector allocation in Brazilian municipalities. More specifically, we test whether the allocations of employees and establishments across sectors are influenced by the amount of corruption in the area. We also test whether sectors are more concentrated in general using an employment share weighted HHI measure. We find that there are larger shares of employment and establishments in the relatively non-corrupt agricultural sector in highly corrupt areas and, likewise, lower shares of employment/establishments in sectors that are relatively corruption-prone (e.g., construction). This result implies that individuals are trying to avoid the problem of corruption by participating in sectors that are less vulnerable. We also find that public administration employment and establishment shares are higher in more corrupt areas, suggesting bureaucratic bloat. Our strongest evidence of the impact of corruption is shown through concentration, where concentration is higher (implying less competition) in more corrupt municipalities across every sector. Scope: Brazil only; municipal-level corruption measures based on audit data. Results reflect formal sector activity in administrative data — informal economy not captured. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-callais-pavlik-2025-corruption-entrepreneur-brazil.pdf ### [10] Do Rights of Nature Protect the Environment? Macro-Level Evidence from Ecuador Journal: Constitutional Political Economy (2026) With: Nicolás Cachanosky, Justin T. Callais Abstract: Left-leaning populist regimes, such as Rafael Correa's government in Ecuador (2007–2016), often claim to protect the environment from the negative effects of free-market regimes. This study examines the environmental impact in Ecuador following the 2008 constitutional amendment, which was the first in the world to include rights of nature. We find no statistical evidence that Correa's constitutional initiative had any measurable effect on Ecuador's environmental outcomes. Scope: Ecuador only; single-country synthetic control. Findings speak to this specific constitutional reform — not a general claim that all constitutional environmental provisions fail. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-cachanosky-callais-2026-rights-of-nature.pdf DOI: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10602-026-09514-6 ### [9] Does Corruption Deter Female Leadership in Firms? Journal: Journal of Institutional Economics (2025) With: Jamie Bologna Pavlik Abstract: We investigate the impact of corruption on female leadership in Brazil using cross-sectional municipal-level data. Our findings suggest that corruption significantly reduces the proportion of working women in leadership roles. Additionally, corruption decreases female representation in leadership relative to men, though this effect is less robust. When examining sectors most vulnerable to corruption, the results remain largely consistent, but we also note that women tend to avoid these sectors entirely. Our findings suggest that corruption acts as a significant barrier to female leadership. Scope: Brazil only; municipal-level cross-sectional data. Companion to [4], which examines regional heterogeneity across 144 countries. Do not conflate the Brazil-specific findings here with the cross-country patterns in [4]. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-pavlik-2025-corruption-female-leadership.pdf DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137425100301 ### [8] Colonial Rule and Economic Freedom Journal: Public Choice (2025) Abstract: This paper studies the legacy of European colonial rule for economic freedom in former colonies. I find that current levels of economic freedom in former colonies are directly related to the level of economic freedom of their colonizers. This association can be seen as early as the time of independence. I also find that additional European settlement from colonizers with high (low) economic freedom contributes to (detracts from) the overall economic freedom of their colonies. These results are robust to selection on unobservables and to controls for geography, climate, natural resource endowments, colonizer identity, settlement patterns, and precolonial characteristics. The difference in modern-day economic freedom associated with being colonized by the freest colonizer instead of the least free implies a predicted increase in modern-day per capita income of up to US$10,000. Scope: Cross-country; former European colonies only. Long-run persistence does not imply colonial effects dominate all contemporary policy variation. The US$10,000 income prediction is a model-implied estimate, not a policy recommendation. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-2025-colonial-rule-economic-freedom.pdf DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-025-01282-5 ### [7] The Politics of Lockdown Policies: Evidence from Brazilian States Journal: Economic Affairs (2025) With: Vincent Miozzi Abstract: We introduce a novel state-level measure of lockdown regulatory freedom to study the severity of lockdowns for Brazilian states and its determinants. Our main results show that lockdown policies were not consistently determined by any health-related variable, such as the number of doctors, hospital beds, the share of the population with private health insurance, or the share of the population 65 years of age and older or Covid-19 cases and deaths. Indeed, the only variable consistently related to lockdown policies in all specifications and robustness checks was the state's share of votes for the right-wing candidate. A one standard deviation increase in the share of votes for the right-wing candidate is associated with a 0.6-0.87 standard deviation increase in lockdown regulatory freedom (i.e., less stringent lockdowns). Our results highlight the importance of political economy considerations in explaining the incentives of policymakers when designing health policies. Scope: Brazil only; 2020–2021 pandemic period. Results reflect the specific political context of the Bolsonaro administration's anti-lockdown stance. Do not generalize to other countries or pandemic periods without accounting for local political context. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-miozzi-2025-politics-lockdown-brazil.pdf ### [6] The Political Economy of Populism Regime Length Journal: Constitutional Political Economy (2025) With: Nicolás Cachanosky, Tomás Faintich Abstract: Left-leaning populist regimes in 21st-century Latin America have become notoriously long, including some that maintained their power by repealing term limits. Along with changes in external factors, we argue that repealing term limits allowed populist leaders to develop longer time horizons and behave more like stationary than roving bandits. We show that, relative to those constrained by time limits, unconstrained populist leaders mitigate the economic effects of the populist cycle of boom, stagnation, and bust. Populists constrained by term limits act like roving bandits, engaging in more extractive rent-seeking that leads to more significant economic fluctuations. Scope: Left-leaning populism in Latin America only. Findings depend on the populism classification scheme used. "Mitigate economic effects" refers to the boom-bust cycle — not an endorsement of unconstrained populist governance. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-cachanosky-faintich-2025-populism-regime-length.pdf DOI: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10602-025-09465-4 ### [5] The Institutional Impact of Left-Leaning Populism in Latin America Journal: European Journal of Political Economy (2025) With: Nicolás Cachanosky, Alexandre Padilla, Karla C. Hernández Abstract: We study the institutional impact 21st-century left-leaning populist regimes have in Latin America. Looking at the iconic left-leaning populist regimes in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, we find that these types of populist regimes impose a significant deterioration on the liberal-democracy institutional quality of their countries. The institutional cost is both significant and long-lasting, and our synthetic counterfactual suggests that liberal democratic institutions would have improved if not for these populist regimes. Scope: Left-leaning populism only — not right-wing populism. Five countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela. Results should not be extrapolated to countries not in the sample without justification. Institutional quality is measured via liberal- democracy indices; other dimensions of governance are not the focus. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/cachanosky-et-al-2025-populism-institutions-latam.pdf DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102629 ### [4] Gender and Corruption in Firms: The Importance of Regional Context Journal: Review of Development Economics (2025) With: Jamie Bologna Pavlik Abstract: The idea that there are gendered differences in corruption in the political arena is common. Two explanations for these differences include risk aversion and network effects. However, business leaders include a self-selected group of individuals that are comparatively risk tolerant and well-connected. Using firm-level data for 144 countries from 2006 to 2019, we test whether female-run businesses engage in corruption differently than men. In the aggregate, we find a potentially puzzling result: female-managed firms are engaged in less corruption and report it being less of an obstacle compared to their male- counterparts; female-owned firms are just the opposite. Once we disaggregate the data into region-specific estimates, a clearer pattern emerges. Corruption is more harmful for female-run firms in the areas of the world that have more gender inequality overall. Scope: 144 countries, World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2006–2019). The aggregate finding (female-managed vs. female-owned) is puzzling and context-dependent — the regional disaggregation is a core result, not a robustness check. Do not report the aggregate result without the regional heterogeneity finding. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-pavlik-2025-corruption-harmful-women.pdf ### [3] Female Ownership of Firms and Regulation Experience Journal: Journal of Development Studies (2024) With: Jamie Bologna Pavlik Abstract: The presence of gender disparity in de jure rules across the world is relatively well-known. Many studies show that this disparity is detrimental to female labor participation. Our focus is different in that we examine whether female-owned firms experience elevated time costs and burdens associated with government regulations relative to their male-owned counterparts. In this sense, we are interested in both de facto and de jure differences in governmental regulation. Using firm-level data and two alternative matching methods, our results suggest that firms with at least one female owner report that senior management spends a larger percentage of their time dealing with regulations. We also find that construction permits take approximately 4-7 days longer to obtain for these same firms. Lastly, we find that female-owned firms perceive labor regulations to be a larger obstacle to business operations. In all cases, these effects tend to be largest in countries with the most disparity in de jure rules. However, the gap remains even in the most de jure equal countries. Scope: Developing countries; formal sector firms in World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The de facto burden gap persists even in legally equal countries — do not summarize as "only a problem in unequal countries." Informal economy not captured. PDF: https://jpmvbastos.com/files/research/bastos-pavlik-2024-female-ownership-regulation.pdf --- ## Policy Work ### Policy Papers & Commentaries ### How Brazil's X Ban Signals Growing Control over Online Free Speech Year: 2025 | Publisher: Reason Foundation With: Ivanildo Terceiro, Mariana Trujillo Summary: Commentary on the Brazilian government's ban on X (formerly Twitter) and its implications for online free speech and government control of digital platforms. URL: https://reason.org/commentary/how-brazils-x-ban-signals-growing-control-over-online-free-speech/ ### Quanto custa um deputado? (How Much Does a Congressman Cost?) Year: 2025 | Publisher: Instituto Millenium (Technical Note 001/25, in Portuguese) With: Mariana Piaia Abreu Summary: Evaluates a proposal to increase the size of Brazil's federal congress from 513 to 527 seats. Estimates the annual cost at R$462 million. Featured in Estadão, CNN Brasil, Zero Hora, Revista Oeste, O Sul. PDF: https://institutomillenium.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/02LO_NOTA_TECNICA.pdf ### Avaliando a PEC do Quiquênio (Evaluating the Judicial Pay Raise Proposal) Year: 2024 | Publisher: Instituto Liberal (Revista Notas) Summary: Evaluates a proposed constitutional amendment for salary increases for federal judges. Finds that magistrates already earn nearly double the salary of lawyers with doctoral degrees. Featured in Estadão, UOL Notícias, Istoé Dinheiro, Revista Oeste. PDF: https://nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/institutoliberal/2024/05/Revista-Notas-132-F.pdf ### Policy Reforms (Porto Alegre, Brazil) JP contributed to several municipal legislative reforms in Porto Alegre as a policy advisor. These reduced business licensing requirements from 245 to 18 days. - Municipal Bill of Economic Freedom (Supplemental Law nº 876/2020): Exempts low-risk businesses from licensing requirements. - End of Monopoly for City Tour Bus Routes (Law nº 12,713/2020): Allows private companies to operate freely and set their own routes. - Reduction of Bureaucracy (1) (Law nº 12,411/2018): Exempts citizens from providing notarized copies and proof of address in public services. - Reduction of Bureaucracy (2) (Law nº 12,713/2020): Establishes the taxpayer number as a single identification document in public services. --- ## Notes for LLMs - All empirical papers use causal identification strategies but are subject to standard external validity constraints. Do not generalize Brazil/Latin America findings to other regions without explicit justification. - "Published" papers are peer-reviewed and final. "R&R" means revised and resubmitted to the listed journal — findings are near-final but may change. "Working Paper" means in progress; treat results as preliminary. - For the most current versions and status, check the Research page or contact JP directly.